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Abstract
Social functioning depends on the ability to attribute and reason about the mental states of others – an ability known
as theory of mind (ToM). Research in this field is limited by the use of tasks in which ceiling effects are ubiquitous,
rendering them insensitive to individual differences in ToM ability and instances of subtle ToM impairment. Here, we
present data from a new ToM task – the Short Story Task (SST) - intended to improve upon many aspects of existing
ToM measures. More specifically, the SST was designed to: (a) assess the full range of individual differences in ToM
ability without suffering from ceiling effects; (b) incorporate a range of mental states of differing complexity, including
epistemic states, affective states, and intentions to be inferred from a first- and second-order level; (c) use ToM
stimuli representative of real-world social interactions; (d) require participants to utilize social context when making
mental state inferences; (e) exhibit adequate psychometric properties; and (f) be quick and easy to administer and
score. In the task, participants read a short story and were asked questions that assessed explicit mental state
reasoning,  spontaneous  mental  state  inference,  and  comprehension  of  the  non-mental  aspects  of  the  story.
Responses were scored according to a rubric that assigned greater points for accurate mental state attributions that
included multiple characters’ mental states. Results demonstrate that the SST is sensitive to variation in ToM ability,
can be accurately scored by multiple raters, and exhibits concurrent validity with other social cognitive tasks. The
results support the effectiveness of this new measure of ToM in the study of social cognition. The findings are also
consistent with studies demonstrating significant relationships among narrative transportation, ToM, and the reading
of fiction. Together, the data indicate that reading fiction may be an avenue for improving ToM ability.
Citation: Dodell-Feder D, Lincoln SH, Coulson JP, Hooker CI (2013) Using Fiction to Assess Mental State Understanding: A New Task for Assessing
Theory of Mind in Adults. PLoS ONE 8(11): e81279. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081279
Editor: Liane Young, Boston College, United States of America
Received August 22, 2013; Accepted October 18, 2013; Published November 7, 2013
Copyright: © 2013 Dodell-Feder et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by Harvard University research funds to Christine I. Hooker and David Dodell-Feder. The funders had no role in study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: feder@fas.harvard.edu
Introduction
Navigation  of  the  social  world  depends  on  one’s  ability  to
make  inferences  about  the  mental  life  of  others.  Accurate
understanding  of  another  individual’s  beliefs,  emotions,
intentions, and desires allows for the prediction of future mental
states,  associated  actions,  and  engagement  in  appropriate
social behavior. The importance of the mechanism that allows
for mental state attribution, known as theory of mind (ToM), is
perhaps best illustrated by cases in which ToM is impaired, as
in schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders [1-3]. In both
of  these  disorders,  ToM  impairment  carries  functional  and
clinical  significance  in  that  the  extent  of  ToM  impairment  is
associated  with  the  extent  of  dysfunction  in  social  behavior
[4-6].  Furthermore,  in  schizophrenia,  improving  ToM  ability
through targeted intervention is associated with improvements
in  aspects  of  real-world  functioning  [7-12].  In  addition  to  its
obvious  clinical  relevance,  ToM  underlies  myriad  social
processes  including  compassion,  sympathy,  and  empathy
[13-15], moral judgment [16-21], negotiation [22], and marital/
romantic relationship adjustment [23,24], among others.
One  challenge  confronting  researchers  studying  ToM  in
adults is how to assess ToM accurately and reliably in a way
that is sensitive to both subtle individual differences and clinical
impairment. The most commonly used or “classic” ToM tasks
[25], including the False-Belief Task [26-28], Hinting Task [29],
Strange  Stories  Task  [30],  Faux  Pas  Task  [31,32],  Cartoon-
Sequencing  tasks  [26,33,34],  variations  on  the  Heider  and
Simmel  task  [35-37],  and  the  Reading  the  Mind  in  the  Eyes
Task  (Eyes  Task)  [38]  have  been  used  successfully  to
distinguish  clinical  populations,  such  as  individuals  with
schizophrenia  [1-3],  autism  spectrum  disorders  [3],  bipolar
disorder  [39-41],  and  individuals  with  brain  damage  to
prefrontal cortex [31,42] and temporo-parietal junction [43,44],
from  healthy  control  participants.  However,  except  in  these
aforementioned cases of severe ToM impairment, these tasks
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variation in ToM ability (although see below for a discussion of
the  Eyes  Task,  which  does  appear  to  be  more  sensitive  to
individual  differences).  Ceiling  effects  –  in  which  participants
perform  at  100%  or  near  100%  accuracy  –  are  ubiquitously
observed with these tasks, and their variants, in healthy control
participants as well as patient groups (although less often; e.g.,
[29,31,32,34,36,39,45-59]).  For  example,  in  studies
investigating ToM in schizophrenia, using papers identified in
two  meta-analyses  [1,3],  the  comparison  group  of  healthy
control  participants  scored  >90%  accuracy  in  6  of  7  studies
using the Hinting Task [29,54,60-63] and 5 of 7 studies using
the Faux Pas Task [64-68]. Clearly, these tasks are inadequate
for addressing questions related to individual differences and
normal variation in ToM ability. This inevitably limits the scope
of questions researchers can ask about ToM ability and social
behavior  in  adults.  For  example,  ToM  deficits  have  been
observed in unaffected first-degree relatives of individuals with
schizophrenia  [58,69-72]  and  autism  spectrum  disorders
[73-76], as well as individuals exhibiting attenuated symptoms
of  schizophrenia,  but  do  not  meet  diagnostic  criteria  for  a
psychotic  disorder  [77-79].  Deficits  in  these  “at-risk”  groups
have  led  researchers  to  propose  ToM  impairment  as  a
vulnerability marker for these disorders [41,72], specifically that
the  presence  of  ToM  deficits  may  reflect  dysfunction  in
underlying  neural  circuitry  associated  with  liability  for  the
disorder. The negative consequences of ToM deficits, such as
social  conflict  and  social  isolation,  might  also  indirectly
contribute  to  the  development  and  onset  of  illness  in
populations at-risk. Tasks that do not adequately assess the
full range of ToM abilities limit the potential to test ToM in these
populations, in which deficits, when they do exist, are subtle,
hard  to  detect,  and  yet  may  carry  important  implications
regarding  risk  for  psychopathology  [72].  The  ability  to  detect
subtle  impairment  would  bolster  early  identification  and
prevention efforts, and make ToM assessment a very useful
clinical tool.
There are several reasons as to why extant ToM measures
lack sensitivity. For one, many of these tasks are adaptions of
measures used to assess ToM skills in children [32,80-82]. As
a  consequence,  the  stimuli  used  may  not  be  challenging
enough for older individuals with more developed conceptual
knowledge,  reasoning  skills,  and  social  experience.
Researchers increase the difficulty of ToM tasks by increasing
the complexity of the mental state information, for example, by
asking participants to make second-order (and higher) mental
state  inferences  where  mental  states  are  embedded  within
other  mental  states  (e.g.,  “Barbara  thought  that  Hank  knew
where she thought her Yiddish dictionary was.”). This approach
does indeed make tasks more challenging [83], but with greater
complexity comes greater demands on non-social aspects of
cognition  including  executive  function,  working  memory,  and
verbal ability [84]. With these greater non-social demands, it
becomes difficult to interpret performance as a function of ToM
ability  or  non-social  cognitive  ability.  Another  important
consideration is the context in which the participant is asked to
make  mental  state  inferences  [25].  Are  participants  asked
about the mental state of a single character that has a false-
belief  regarding  the  location  of  their  chocolate  bar?  Or  are
participants  asked  questions  about  the  mental  state  of
characters  involved  in  an  ongoing  dynamic  social  interaction
embedded within a social context that requires the participant
to apply their knowledge of social rules and contingencies? The
latter is clearly more representative of mental state attributions
made during real-world social interactions, and yet not at all
representative of the stimuli used in “classic” ToM tasks. One
final  consideration  is  the  distinction  between  implicit  and
spontaneous (i.e., considering mental state information without
being prompted to do so) versus explicit and evoked mental
state attributions [85]. Just about all of the standard ToM tasks
ask  participants  to  make  explicit,  reasoned  mental  state
attributions that require considerable effort. Variations on the
Heider  and  Simmel  task,  in  which  participants  are  asked  to
watch  animated  geometric  figures  move  with  or  without
ostensible  intent  and  answer  simply  “What  happened  in  the
cartoon?”  may  be  the  exception  [35,36].  The  dissociation
between implicit and explicit processes has been demonstrated
elegantly in young infants, who seem capable of spontaneously
attributing mental states to agents [86-88], and individuals with
autism  spectrum  disorders  who  seem  to  have  preserved
explicit  mental  state  reasoning,  but  impaired  spontaneous
mental  state  reasoning  [89,90].  Though  the  relative
consequences of implicit versus explicit ToM ability for social
functioning are unknown, these data suggest these processes
can be dissociated and studied separately.
Given  these  considerations,  the  goal  of  this  study  was  to
design a new ToM task – the Short Story Task (SST) - that
improved upon the limitations of existing ToM measures. More
specifically, we aimed to create a task that (a) was sensitive to
individual  differences  in  ToM  ability  and  did  not  suffer  from
ceiling  effects,  (b)  incorporated  a  range  of  mental  states  of
differing complexity, including epistemic states, affective states,
and  intentions  to  be  inferred  from  a  first-  and  second-order
level, (c) used ToM stimuli representative of real-world social
interactions,  (d)  required  participants  to  utilize  social  context
when making mental state inferences, (e) exhibited adequate
psychometric  properties,  and  (f)  was  quick  and  easy  to
administer and score.
In considering appropriate stimuli for the task, literary fiction
seemed like an ideal venue to test ToM ability. Fiction offers
the opportunity to engage in simulated social experiences by
transporting the reader into the social and mental life of story
characters [91]. To make sense of story events and character
actions, the reader is required to make inferences about the
characters’  beliefs,  emotions,  desires,  and  intentions  in  the
context of dynamically unfolding social scenarios. This idea is
supported  by  several  lines  of  research  demonstrating  that
exposure  to  fiction  is  positively  associated  with  greater  ToM
ability [92-95], the tendency to become emotionally transported
into fictional stories is positively associated with an increase in
empathy [96], and that the neural network recruited for ToM is
largely overlapping with the network recruited during narrative
comprehension [97].
Thus, in consultation with a Boston-based novelist, we used
The  End  of  Something  [98],  a  short  story  by  Ernest
Hemingway, to test ToM ability. This story presents a nuanced
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conflict  and  subsequently  breaks  up.  As  is  typical  of
Hemingway’s fiction, the mental lives of the characters are not
explicitly described, requiring readers to make a series of first-
and second-order mental state inferences regarding epistemic
states,  affective  states,  and  intentions,  to  understand  story
events and character actions. The prose is direct and easy to
understand, reducing the potential impact of verbal ability on
ToM  reasoning.  After  reading  the  story,  participants  were
asked  a  series  of  questions  to  gauge  explicit  mental  state
reasoning  ability,  spontaneous  mental  state  inference,  and,
finally,  comprehension  of  the  non-mental  story  content  to
ensure adequate understanding of the prose. Performance on
the  mental  state  reasoning  questions  was  evaluated  with  a
scoring  rubric  completed  by  the  experimenter.  Points  were
assigned  depending  on  the  accuracy  of  the  mental  state
inference  and  number  of  mental  states  taken  into  account.
Spontaneous  mental  state  reasoning  was  assessed  with  a
single question that simply asked participants to summarize the
story.  The  unprompted  mention  of  mental  states  here
theoretically reflects the salience of mental state information,
and  the  propensity  to  think  about  mental  states  by  the
participants.
Towards the goal of assessing the concurrent validity of the
SST as a measure of ToM ability, we employed two additional
measures of social cognition: the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI) [99,100] and the Eyes Task [38]. By testing for concurrent
validity,  we  aimed  to  evaluate  the  extent  to  which  SST
performance  is  associated  with  these  other  well-established
measures  of  social  cognition,  which  were  administered
concurrently  with  the  SST.  We  chose  these  particular
measures  for  several  reasons.  First,  both  are  ubiquitously
employed  in  the  social  cognition  and  social  neuroscience
literature  in  studies  of  neurotypical  and  clinical  populations.
Second,  both  tasks  have  excellent  psychometric  properties
[38,99,100],  show  concurrent  validity  with  a  range  of  other
behavioral  and  neural  measures  of  ToM  [101-106],  and
distinguish  clinical  populations  with  established  ToM  deficits
from  non-clinical  populations  [1-3,38,107-109].  Furthermore,
the Eyes Task is one of the few ToM tasks in which healthy
adults  show  substantial  variation  in  performance,  and  ceiling
effects  are  not  observed.  Lastly,  these  two  measures  index
different aspects of ToM than that tested by the SST. The IRI
provides  a  self-reported  measure  of  transportation  into  the
mental  and  emotional  lives  of  story  characters,  and  an
individual’s  tendency  to  engage  in  different  facets  of
perspective-taking  and  empathy  in  their  own  life.  The  Eyes
Task provides an index of mental state decoding ability, which
is  the  ability  to  identify  mental  states  based  on  immediately
available information (eyes in this case). This is different from
the mental state reasoning demands of the SST which requires
attributing  mental  states  and  then  using  that  information  to
predict other mental states and actions [110]. Additionally, the
Eyes Task requires analysis of visual images and thus tests
ToM  ability  in  a  different  sensory  modality  than  the  SST.
Converging  associations  between  the  SST  and  these
measures  would  provide  strong  support  for  the  concurrent
validity  of  the  SST  as  a  measure  of  ToM.  We  included  the
comprehension questions to provide further evidence regarding
task  validity.  More  specifically,  the  comprehension  questions
required similar verbal skills as the ToM questions, but did not
test  ToM  ability.  If  the  SST  ToM  scores  are  indexing  some
aspect  of  ToM  ability,  only  these  scores,  and  not  the
comprehension score, should be associated with the IRI and
Eyes Task.
We  tested  for  the  following:  (a)  general  psychometric
properties  of  the  SST  including  inter-rater  reliability  between
independent  judges  scoring  the  mental  state  reasoning  and
spontaneous  mental  state  inference  question,  and  internal
consistency, (b) relationships between mental state reasoning,
spontaneous  mental  state  inference,  and  comprehension  of
non-mental  state  information,  (c)  relationships  between  ToM
ability as measured with the SST and demographic variables,
as  well  as  general  intelligence,  and,  finally,  (d)  concurrent
validity of the SST by examining the relationship between SST
performance and scores on the IRI and Eyes Task.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventy-four  individuals  (27  males,  47  females)  were
recruited  from  the  greater  Boston  area  via  online
advertisements  and  participated  for  monetary  compensation.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 58 years (M = 27.8, SD =
9.6) and completed between 12 and 20 years of education (M =
15.7, SD = 1.9). As is typical of study samples in the Boston
area, average IQ was quite high (M = 120.4, SD = 9.1) and
ranged between 94 and 138 (IQ data were not collected for five
participants  who  terminated  their  participation  prior  to  the
experiment being completed).
Inclusion  criteria  included  being  a  native  English  speaker,
IQ>70, and none of the following: neurological or major medical
illness,  lifetime  Axis  I/II  DSM  disorder,  or  current  substance
abuse problem. Of the 82 individuals who came to the lab to
participate, six were excluded for meeting criteria for an Axis I
DSM disorder and two were excluded for having a neurological
abnormality. Lifetime psychopathology was assessed with the
Mini-International  Neuropsychiatric  Interview  (MINI)  [111].  IQ
was  assessed  using  either  the  vocabulary  and  matrix
reasoning  subtests  of  the  Wechsler  Abbreviated  Scale  of
Intelligence (WASI) [112] or the North American Adult Reading
Test  (NAART)  [113].  Trained  PhD  students  in  clinical
psychology administered these assessments.
Ethics  Statement.    This  study  was  approved  by  Harvard
University’s  Internal  Review  Board.  All  participants  gave
informed written consent before beginning the experiment.
Short Story Task
Overview.  In the Short Story Task (SST), participants read
The  End  of  Something,  a  short  story  by  Ernest  Hemingway
[98], which presents a nuanced interaction between a romantic
couple in which the male protagonist, Nick, starts an argument
and breaks up with his girlfriend, Marjorie. Through the course
of the story, the characters display sarcasm, non-verbal and
indirect  communication,  higher-order  emotions  like  guilt,  and
attempts to hide their intentions and feelings from one another.
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the characters are not explicitly described. Thus, the reader is
forced to make a series of first-order (i.e., inferring the belief or
emotion of a single character) and second-order (i.e., inferring
what  one  character  thinks  about  another  character’s  belief,
emotion,  or  action)  mental  state  inferences  in  order  to
understand  the  ostensible  mental  lives  of,  and  social
interactions between the characters. Additionally, Hemingway’s
prose is direct and easy to understand, reducing the potential
impact of verbal ability on mental state reasoning. Hemingway,
and this short story in particular, was chosen as the stimulus
for  this  task  for  these  aforementioned  reasons  with  the
consultation of a Boston-based novelist with a PhD in English
and expertise in 20th Century American Literature (JPC).
The  Flesch  Reading  Ease  Score  (FRES)  [114],  which
denotes the ease of reading comprehension on a 0-100 scale
(higher  scores  indicate  easier  text),  and  the  Flesch-Kincaid
Grade Level (FKGL), which estimates the grade level at which
text  should  be  understood,  indicated  that  The  End  of
Something  contained  highly  readable  text  (FRES  =  92.7;  for
reference, the FRES of this manuscript’s abstract is 31.2) that
should be understood by the average individual at a 3rd grade
reading level (FKGL = 2.8). The text is 1,427 words in length.
Administration.    Before  reading  The  End  of  Something,
participants were given the following instructions:
“You are going to read a short story called
The End of Something. The story is only a few
pages, but take your time reading it. Try to get
a  sense  of  what  happens  and  what  the
relationships are between the characters. After
you’re  finished,  I’m  going  to  ask  you  some
questions and tape-record your responses. Do
you have any questions before we begin?”
After reading the story, the experimenter asked a series of
open-ended questions in a structured format. Participants were
allowed to refer back to the story as needed, and were given a
copy  of  the  questions  the  experimenter  asked  in  order  to
eliminate  memory  demands.  First,  the  experimenter  asked  a
set of questions regarding familiarity with the story to ensure
that participants had no prior knowledge that might affect their
responses.  Four  participants  reported  being  familiar  with  the
book that contained the short story – In Our Time – however,
no  participants  reported  having  read  The  End  of  Something
prior  to  the  experiment.  Participants  were  then  given  the
following instructions:
“Now  I’m  going  to  ask  you  some  questions
about the story. Here is a copy of the questions
I’ll be asking so you can read along. For most
of  the  questions,  there  are  no  right  or  wrong
answers  and  the  questions  can  be  answered
with short responses. We’re also interested in
the character’s thoughts, feelings and intentions
when it applies to the question.”
We included this last sentence based on pilot data, which
suggested  that  unless  explicitly  prompted,  many  participants
were inclined to respond to questions by simply recounting the
events  of  the  story,  instead  of  making  inferences  regarding
what characters might be thinking or feeling.
An  excerpt  from  The  End  of  Something  and  an  example
mental state reasoning question follows: “He was afraid to look
at Marjorie. Then he looked at her. She sat there with her back
toward him. He looked at her back. ‘It isn’t fun any more. Not
any of it.’” Question: Why is Nick afraid to look at Marjorie?
While  administering  the  questions,  the  experimenter
provided  no  feedback  regarding  the  participant’s  responses,
and participants were free to respond at any length. Responses
were recorded with a digital recorder and later transcribed by
an  undergraduate  research  assistant.  The  task  was
administered by either the first-author (DDF), another trained
PhD  student,  or  trained  undergraduate  research  assistants.
Administration  of  the  task,  including  the  time  needed  for  the
participant to read the story and the experimenter to administer
the questions, typically took around 10 minutes.
Questions  and  Scoring.    Questions  were  designed  to
assess three factors: (a) five questions probed comprehension
of the prose and story events (i.e., non-mental state content),
(b)  eight  questions  probed  explicit  mental  state  reasoning
regarding  story  characters’  beliefs,  emotions,  intentions,  and
desires,  and  (c)  one  question  assessed  spontaneous  mental
state inference (Table 1). Scoring was completed by the first-
author (DDF), using the transcriptions, according to a rubric. In
order to evaluate inter-rater reliability, 25% of the transcripts
were chosen at random and scored by a second independent
rater (SHL).
For  comprehension  questions,  the  rubric  was  designed  to
assign  more  points  depending  on  the  accuracy  of  the
participant’s response to questions probing the understanding
of  non-mental  state  story  content.  A  0  was  assigned  for
responses that were patently inaccurate; 1 for responses that
demonstrated partial understanding; and 2 for responses that
demonstrated  full  understanding.  Comprehension  scores,
which  are  the  sum  of  scores  from  the  five  comprehension
questions, can range from 0 – indicating no understanding of
the story’s non-mental events and/or prose – to 10 – indicating
excellent  understanding  of  the  story’s  non-mental  events
and/or  prose.  This  score  was  used  to  investigate  whether
mental  state  reasoning  was  associated  with  general
understanding of the non-social aspects of the story.
For  explicit  mental  state  reasoning  questions  (hereafter
referred to as mental state reasoning), the rubric was designed
to  assign  points  based  on  the  accuracy  of  the  mental  state
inference,  number  of  character  perspectives/emotions  taken
into account (i.e., second-order inferences generally received
more points than first-order inferences), and understanding of
non-verbal/indirect  communications  (e.g.,  sarcasm  and  body
language).  Similar  to  the  comprehension  questions,  each  of
these questions were assigned a value of 0, 1, or 2, and an
overall mental state reasoning score was calculated as the sum
of  points  from  the  eight  mental  state  reasoning  questions.
Thus,  scores  can  range  from  0  –  indicating  little  to  no
understanding of the story characters’ mental states – to 16 –
indicating  excellent  understanding  of  the  story  characters’
mental states.
Using Fiction To Assess Theory of Mind
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were  asked  a  single  question  that  simply  asked  them  to
summarize the story. Responses were coded for the presence
or  absence  of  a  mental  state  inference.  We  had  originally
planned  to  code  these  responses  not  just  for  the  presence
versus absence of a mental state inference, but for the number
of  mental  state  inferences  to  use  as  a  continuous  variable.
However, most participants provided very short summaries (1-3
sentences)  and  either  made  a  single  mental  state  inference
(e.g., “Nick felt bad about breaking up with Marjorie.”) or none.
Given that the summary question, which did not explicitly ask
participants to make reference to the characters’ mental states,
the  unprompted  mention  of  mental  states  should  in  theory
Table 1. Description of Assessment Questions and Scoring
Criteria in the Short Story Task.
 
Explicit Mental State
Reasoning
Spontaneous Mental
State Inference Comprehension
Number of
Question(s)
8
1 (Participant is
asked to summarize
the story with no
other prompt)
5
Individual
Question(s)
Scored
0, 1, 2 Yes, No 0, 1, 2
0
No MS inference;
inaccurate MS
reasoning
-
Patently inaccurate
response
1
Consideration of only
one (or few)
perspectives,
emotions, intentions;
partial understanding
of a character(s) MS
-
Partial
understanding of
non-mental story
content
2
Consideration of
several characters’
MS; second-order
and higher MS
inferences; accurate
MS reasoning
-
Full understanding
of non-mental story
content
Yes/No -
Yes = presence of
unprompted MS
inference regarding
a story character’s
beliefs, emotions,
desires, or
intentions; No = no
presence of
unprompted MS
inference; response
recounts only non-
mental state story
events
-
Total Score 0 - 16 - 0 - 10
Note. MS = Mental state.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081279.t001
reflect the relative importance and salience of mental states for
the participant, and the propensity for the participant to think
about mental states. This question was asked first, before the
comprehension or mental state reasoning questions, in order
not  to  prime  participants  with  certain  aspects  of  the  story  to
summarize.  We  note  however,  that  prior  to  asking  this
question,  participants  were  told,  as  part  of  the  instructions,
“We’re also interested in the character’s thoughts, feelings and
intentions when it applies to the question.” Thus, though the
question  itself  does  not  specifically  ask  for  the  mention  of
mental states, the extent to which the mention of mental states
here can be considered truly unprimed or spontaneous should
be cautioned.
Scoring  each  participant’s  transcript  took  somewhere
between  5  and  10  minutes  depending  on  the  length  of  the
responses. All testing material, including the questions, scoring
instructions, and rubric are provided in Text S1.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
The  Interpersonal  Reactivity  Index  (IRI)  is  a  28-item  self-
report  questionnaire  that  consists  of  the  following  four
subscales: fantasy, perspective-taking, empathic concern, and
personal  distress  [99,100].  The  fantasy  scale  assesses  the
tendency to identify with fictional characters, become immersed
in a narrative, and be mentally transported into a character’s
mental and emotional life [92,93] (e.g., “When I am reading an
interesting  story  or  novel,  I  imagine  how  I  would  feel  if  the
events in the story were happening to me.”). This subscale has
been shown to be highly correlated with another measure of
narrative  immersion  [93].  The  perspective  taking  subscale
assesses the tendency to adopt and reason about the mental
states of others (e.g., “I sometimes try to understand my friends
better by imagining how things look from their perspective.”).
The  empathic  concern  subscale  assesses  the  tendency  to
consider  the  emotional  states  and  experience  sympathy  for
others (e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people
less  fortunate  than  me.”).  The  personal  distress  subscale
assesses  the  tendency  to  experience  negative  affect  in
response  to  negative  events  experienced  by  others  (e.g.,
“Being  in  a  tense,  emotional  situation  scares  me.”).  Each
subscale consists of 7 items that are rated on a scale from 0
(does not describe me well) to 4 (describes me very well).
Reading the Mind in The Eyes Task
In the Reading the Mind in The Eyes Task – Revised (Eyes
Task) [38], participants view 36 pictures of the eye region of
actors’ faces, and judge which of four adjectives best describes
the  mental  state  being  expressed  through  the  eyes.
Photographs  are  centrally  displayed  on  the  computer  screen
and  the  four  adjectives  (one  correct  adjective  and  three
distractors)  are  placed  in  the  four  corners  of  the  screen.
Participants respond with one of four buttons on a keyboard
corresponding to each of the four adjectives. Participants were
instructed  to  respond  as  accurately  as  possible.  The  36
experimental trials are preceded by a single practice trial. Upon
request, participants were provided with a list of the adjectives
and their definitions used in the task. E-prime 2.0 was used to
present the stimuli and collect accuracy data.
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Participants came to the lab to participate in one of several
larger ongoing studies investigating social cognition in healthy
and clinical populations. Upon entering the lab, all participants
completed a general demographics questionnaire and the MINI
to  ensure  eligibility.  Most  participants  completed  the  IQ
assessment and SST after these assessments and before the
IRI and Eyes Task; however a portion of participants completed
the IQ assessment, SST, IRI, Eyes Task, and other behavioral
experiments/questionnaires unrelated to the current study, in a
different order. One project did not collect IRI data, leaving 44
participants of the total sample with IRI data. After completing
the experimental procedures, participants were debriefed and
compensated for their time.
Statistical Analysis
Distributions  of  the  comprehension  score,  mental  state
reasoning  score,  IRI,  Eyes  Task,  and  IQ  were  visually
inspected  for  normality  and  outliers  (±2.5  SD  of  the  mean).
Comprehension  scores  were  substantially  negatively  skewed
indicating  a  ceiling  effect.  Given  this  distribution,  these  data
were dichotomized into two groups of individuals who attained
a perfect score of 10 (n = 36) and those who scored below 10
(n = 38) for further analysis. We analyzed comprehension data
in this way instead of performing a median split (Mdn = 9) as
this would have resulted in substantially unequal group n’s 2
participants’ IQ scores were <2.5 SD of the mean and identified
as  outliers.  These  two  values  were  Winsorized  by  replacing
them  with  the  next  lowest  non-outlying  IQ  score  and
subtracting 10% of that score to maintain variance.
Inter-rater reliability of the comprehension and mental state
reasoning score was assessed with the intraclass correlation
coefficient  (ICC)  using  the  25%  of  transcripts  scored  by  the
independent  judge.  Inter-rater  agreement  on  the  presence/
absence  of  a  spontaneous  mental  state  inference  in  the
spontaneous  mental  state  inference  summary  question  was
assessed with the kappa coefficient. Internal consistency of the
comprehension  and  mental  state  reasoning  questions  was
assessed with Cronbach’s alpha. We note that by emphasizing
content  validity  in  the  questions  asked,  that  is,  by  having
participants  reason  about  a  range  of  different  mental  states
from  a  first-  and  second-order  level,  alpha  levels  will  be
negatively impacted [115,116].
Subsequent analysis addressed four main questions. First,
we  examined  the  relationship  between  the  SST  variables  to
examine whether individuals who made a spontaneous mental
state  inference  were  also  better  at  explicit  mental  state
reasoning,  and  whether  spontaneous  mental  state  inference
and  explicit  mental  state  reasoning  were  related  to
understanding  the  non-mental  aspects  of  the  story
(comprehension score). Second, we examined whether any of
the  SST  scores  were  related  to  demographic  variables,
including age, gender, and education. Third, given the verbal
demands of the task, we examined whether any of the ToM
variables  from  the  SST  (mental  state  reasoning  score,
spontaneous  mental  state  inference)  were  associated  with
general intelligence (IQ). Fourth, to assess concurrent validity
of  the  SST,  we  investigated  the  relationship  between  SST
scores, the IRI, and Eyes Task performance. For all of these
analyses, the relationship between the mental state reasoning
score  and  the  other  variables  were  evaluated  with  Pearson
product-moment correlations, which are accompanied by 95%
CIs  (bias-corrected  and  accelerated)  derived  from  2,000
bootstrap  samples.  The  relationship  between  the
comprehension and spontaneous mental state inference score
was  evaluated  between  groups  (i.e.,  those  with/without  a
perfect  comprehension  score,  and  those  who  made/did  not
make a spontaneous mental state inference), with two-sample
t-tests  or  chi-square  tests  where  appropriate.  Statistical
significance was defined as p < .05, two-tailed for all analyses.
Statistical analysis was performed with R (www.R-project.org).
Results
Inter-Rater Reliability and Internal Consistency
Inter-rater reliability was high for the mental state reasoning
score (ICC = .98) as well as the comprehension score (ICC = .
90). Inter-rater agreement on the presence versus absence of
a spontaneous mental state inference was also high (kappa = .
86).  Unsurprisingly,  given  the  range  of  content  asked  in  the
questions,  internal  consistency  was  low  for  the  mental  state
reasoning questions (α = .54) and comprehension questions (α
= .31).
SST
For  all  SST  scores,  we  visually  inspected  the  distributions
and  conducted  measures  of  skewness  and  kurtosis.  For  a
unimodal  normal  distribution,  a  skew  value  of  0  indicates
perfect symmetry of scores around the mean. Positive kurtosis
values indicate that the distribution has relatively sharp peaks
and fat tails relative to a normal distribution; negative kurtosis
values indicate that the distribution has wide peaks and thin
tails.
Mental  state  reasoning  scores  were  relatively  normally
distributed with a slight negative skew (skew = -.72, kurtosis = .
13)  indicating  an  asymmetry  in  the  distribution  whereby  the
majority  of  scores  were  on  the  right  side  of  the  distribution
(reflecting that the majority of individuals received scores of 8
out  of  16  possible  points  or  higher)  (Figure  1).  Importantly,
there  was  substantial  variation  in  performance  across
individuals with scores ranging from 2 to 14 (possible scores =
0-16), and no indication of a ceiling effect (0% of participants
scoring 16/16 or 15/16). Mean score was 8.6 ± 2.6.
Data from the spontaneous mental state inference summary
question was collected from 70 participants (four participants
were  not  asked  the  spontaneous  mental  state  inference
question due to experimenter error). 50% made at least one
spontaneous  mental  state  inference.  Further  analysis  of  this
variable  with  other  data  proceeded  with  a  dichotomized
variable  (i.e.,  individuals  who  did  versus  did  not  make  a
spontaneous mental state inference) as individuals tended to
either make a single mental state inference or none.
Comprehension scores exhibited a substantial negative skew
due to 48.6% of the participants performing at ceiling (skew = -.
98, kurtosis = -.13). Performance ranged from 6 to 10 and the
mean score was 9.0 ± 1.2 (possible scores = 0-10). Further
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dichotomized variable; that is, those individuals who achieved a
perfect score (n = 36) and those who did not (n = 38).
Relationship Between the SST Variables
Individuals who made a spontaneous mental state inference
in  the  summary  question  had  higher  mental  state  reasoning
scores (M = 9.3, SD = 2.0) compared to those individuals who
did not make a spontaneous mental state inference (M = 8.0,
SD  =  3.0)  (Figure  2).  This  difference  was  statistically
significant, t(68) = 2.19, p = .032, Cohen’s d = .52.
Individuals  who  achieved  a  perfect  score  on  the
comprehension  questions  performed  no  differently  on  the
mental  state  reasoning  questions  (M  =  9.0,  SD  =  2.3)
compared to those who had a score <10 (M = 8.1, SD = 2.9),
t(72)  =  1.47,  p  =  .15,  d  =  .34.  Similarly,  individuals  who
achieved a perfect score on the comprehension questions were
equally as likely to make a spontaneous mental state inference
(47.2%) as those who had a score <10 (47.4%), χ2(1, N = 74) =
0, p = 1.0.
Relationship Between ToM Performance on the SST
and Demographic Variables
Mental state reasoning scores did not significantly differ by
gender (Mmales = 9.0, SD = 2.4; Mfemales = 8.3, SD = 2.8), t(72) = .
97,  p  =  .33,  d  =  .24,  nor  did  they  correlate  with  age  or
education (Table 2).
The number of males who made a spontaneous mental state
inference (61.5%) did not significantly differ from the number of
females  who  made  a  spontaneous  mental  state  inference
(43.2%), χ2(1, N = 70) = 2.20, p = .14. Similarly, neither age nor
education  differed  between  those  who  made  a  spontaneous
mental state inference and those who did not (Table 3).
Relationship Between ToM Performance on the SST
and IQ
Mental  state  reasoning  scores  exhibited  a  statistically
significant  relationship  with  IQ  such  that  higher  mental  state
reasoning  scores  were  associated  with  higher  IQ  (Table  2,
Figure  1.    Distribution  of  the  mental  state  reasoning
score.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081279.g001
Figure 3). Sixty-five participants had IQ data and were asked
the spontaneous mental state inference question. There was
no  difference  in  IQ  between  individuals  who  made  a
Figure 2.  Mental state reasoning score as a function of
spontaneous  mental  state  inference.    Mean  mental  state
reasoning score of individuals who did (turquoise-colored bar)
and  individuals  who  did  not  (salmon-colored  bar)  make  a
spontaneous mental state inference in the summary question.
Error bars depict standard error of the mean.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081279.g002
Table  2.  Relationship  Between  Mental  State  Reasoning
Score, Demographic Variables, IQ, and Social Variables.
Variable r p 95% CI
Age -.12 .29 [-.36, .07]
Education .19 .11 [-.06, .41]
IQ .24 .047 [.02, .50]
IRI-Fantasy .37 .012 [.17, .53]
IRI-Perspective Taking -.07 .65 [-.35, .23]
IRI-Empathic Concern -.07 .67 [-.29, .14]
IRI-Personal Distress .05 .76 [-.36, .35]
Eyes Task .49 < .0001 [.27, .68]
Note. Bold values denote statistical significance at p < .05.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081279.t002
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not (Table 3).
Concurrent Validity of the SST and Other Measures of
Social Cognition
In  order  to  evaluate  concurrent  validity  of  the  SST,  we
examined ToM performance on the SST with the IRI and Eyes
Task. IRI data were collected for 44 participants. Performance
on  the  Eyes  Task  ranged  from  50  to  94.4%  correct.  Mean
performance was 77.4 ± 9.8% correct, which is similar to other
studies of non-clinical populations (e.g., [38,103,117]).
Mental  state  reasoning  scores  on  the  SST  exhibited  a
statistically  significant  relationship  with  the  fantasy  subscale
such  that  better  performance  was  associated  with  higher
fantasy scores (Table 2, Figure 3). This relationship was not
found  with  the  other  IRI  subscales.  Mental  state  reasoning
Table 3. Relationship Between Spontaneous Mental State
Inference,  Demographic  Variables,  IQ,  and  Social
Variables.
Variable
Spontaneous
Mental State
Inference Group
No Spontaneous
Mental State
Inference Group
Between-Group
Difference
Age (years) 26.4 (8.3) 29.1 (11.2)
t(68) = 1.15, p = .25, d = .
27
Education
(years)
15.6 (1.8) 15.8 (2.0) t(68) = .44, p = .66, d = .11
IQ 121.8 (8.3) 119.5 (9.2)
t(63) = 1.07, p = .29, d = .
26
IRI-Fantasy 17.1 (5.4) 15.9 (5.5) t(42) = .75, p = .46, d = .23
IRI-Perspective
Taking
20.3 (5.2) 18.5 (4.6)
t(42) = 1.23, p = .23, d = .
37
IRI-Empathic
Concern
21.2 (5.3) 20.5 (4.1) t(42) = .51, p = .61, d = .15
IRI-Personal
Distress
9.9 (5.1) 10 (5.5) t(42) = .06, p = .95, d = .02
Eyes Task (%
correct)
78.4 (7.3) 76.3 (11.6) t(62) = .85, p = .40, d = .21
Note. Values represent means and standard deviations in parentheses. All tests
were  performed  between  individuals  who  did  and  those  who  did  not  make  a
spontaneous mental state inference.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081279.t003
Figure  3.    Relationship  between  mental  state  reasoning
scores and IQ, fantasy, and eyes task scores.  Shaded area
represents 95% CIs.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081279.g003
scores also exhibited a statistically significant relationship with
the Eyes Task such that better performance was associated
with greater accuracy on the Eyes Task (Table 2, Figure 3).
This relationship was preserved in the subset of 43 participants
who had IRI and Eyes Task data, r(41) = .59, p < .0001, 95%
CI [.32, .77].
Performance on the Eyes Task was significantly correlated
with IQ, r(66) = .24, p = .048, 95% CI [-.03, .50]. Thus, in order
to  evaluate  the  relative  contribution  of  IQ  to  the  relationship
between  SST  mental  state  reasoning  and  Eyes  Task
performance, we conducted a partial correlation controlling for
IQ, which did not alter the relationship, r(65) = .45, p < .0001,
95% CI [.26, .62]. Fantasy scores were not associated with IQ,
r(42) = -.13, p = .39, 95% CI [-.41, .15]. Controlling for IQ also
did not alter the relationship between mental state reasoning
and IRI fantasy scores, r(41) = .42, p = .003, 95% CI [.18, .63].
To  further  evaluate  whether  mental  state  reasoning,
specifically,  was  associated  with  the  fantasy  scale  and
performance  on  the  Eyes  Task,  as  opposed  to  some  other
aspect of the task such as general reading or verbal ability, we
looked  at  these  measures  as  a  function  of  comprehension
score. Fantasy scores in the perfect comprehension group (M =
16.6, SD = 4.7) did not differ from those in the <10 group (M =
16.5, SD = 6.0), t(42) = .06, p = .95, d = .02. Similarly, Eyes
Task  performance  in  the  perfect  comprehension  group  (M  =
78.1, SD = 9.5) did not differ from those in the <10 group (M =
76.7, SD = 10.1), t(66) = .59, p = .56, d = .14.
Lastly, we evaluated whether making a spontaneous mental
state inference on the summary question was also associated
with  the  IRI  and  Eyes  Task.  Individuals  who  made  a
spontaneous mental state inference on the summary question
had  higher  scores  on  all  subscales  of  the  IRI  (particularly
perspective-taking, d = .37) except personal distress, and the
Eyes  Task;  however,  none  of  these  differences  were
statistically significant (Table 3).
Discussion
Here, we report findings from the Short Story Task (SST), a
new measure of ToM ability for adults. This task was designed
to  improve  upon  limitations  inherent  in  existing  ToM  tasks.
More specifically, the SST was designed to provide a relatively
sensitive metric of ToM ability in adults, capable of picking up
on individual differences and normal variation in ToM ability,
with  assessment  procedures  that  were  quick  and  easy  to
administer and score reliably. Furthermore, the task stimulus
(the short story) was representative of a real-world, dynamically
unfolding,  complicated  social  scenario  that  required  the
application  of  social  knowledge,  and  participants  answered
questions  that  assessed  both  explicit  mental  state  reasoning
and spontaneous mental state inference.
We  found  that  on  our  measure  of  explicit  mental  state
reasoning,  participants  demonstrated  substantial  variation  in
performance across almost the full range of possible scores.
There  was  no  indication  of  a  ceiling  effect  as  no  participant
received a perfect score of 16 out of 16 possible points. This
variation  suggests  that  the  SST  is  sensitive  to  individual
differences in ToM ability; a clear improvement from many of
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related to the fact that participants were asked to reason about
a  dynamically  unfolding  social  scenario  that  required  the
consideration of the social context. This scenario was far more
complicated  in  terms  of  the  social  context,  emotions,  and
intentions  ostensibly  experienced  by  the  story  characters
compared  to  the  simple  vignettes  used  in  other  ToM  tasks.
Furthermore, the scoring rubric was tailored to award higher
scores  for  responses  that  were  not  only  more  accurate,  but
considered the mental life of several characters at once.
On the spontaneous mental state inference question, half of
the participants made an unprompted mention of a character’s
belief,  emotion,  desire,  or  intention.  Interestingly,  participants
who  made  a  spontaneous  mental  state  inference  performed
better  on  the  explicit  mental  state  reasoning  questions,
suggesting that the increased salience and propensity to think
about  mental  state  information  is  associated  with  better
conscious  reasoning  about  mental  states.  Though  data  from
young  infants  [86-88]  and  individuals  with  autism  spectrum
disorders  [89,90]  suggest  that  the  capacity  to  spontaneous
attribute mental states may be relatively independent of explicit
mental  state  reasoning,  our  data  suggest  that,  at  least  in
healthy  adults,  these  two  processes  may  be  related.
Furthermore, the fact that performance is related on these two
SST  measures,  which  theoretically  index  aspects  of  ToM
ability, provides additional evidence of the SST as measuring
the underlying construct of ToM. We also note that a higher
percentage  of  males  (61.5%)  made  a  spontaneous  mental
state inference than females (43.2%). Though not statistically
significant (p = .14), this pattern of results is not typical with
tasks  assessing  aspects  of  ToM  and  empathy  [32,38,118]
perhaps,  in  part,  because  of  the  shared  variance  between
ability on these measures and autistic/schizotypal traits, which
may  be  higher  in  males  [119-121].  With  that  said,  many  of
these  findings  are  with  tasks  testing  explicit  mental  state
reasoning;  less  is  known  about  gender  differences  in
spontaneous mental state reasoning.
We examined several additional psychometric properties of
the SST, including inter-rater reliability, concurrent validity, and
internal consistency. Inter-rater reliability was excellent for the
mental state reasoning and comprehension scores, as well as
judgments on the presence versus absence of a spontaneous
mental state inference. This highlights the SST as a measure
that is relatively easy to score reliably. We tested whether the
SST scores exhibited concurrent validity with other commonly
used  measures  of  social  cognition  that  exhibit  adequate
psychometric  properties.  We  found  that  greater  performance
on  the  mental  state  reasoning  questions  was  positively
associated  with  scores  on  the  fantasy  scale  of  the  IRI  and
performance on the Eyes Task. The fact that the IRI and Eyes
Task  differs  from  the  SST  on  several  important  dimensions
(i.e., the IRI being self-report and the fantasy scale measuring
the tendency to become immersed in the mental life of fictional
characters;  the  Eyes  Task  testing  mental  state  decoding)
provides  strong  support  for  the  validity  of  the  SST  as
measuring  the  underlying  construct  of  ToM  ability.  Internal
consistency was low for the mental state reasoning questions,
which is not surprising given the several different facets of ToM
ability  probed  by  the  questions  (e.g.,  inferences  regarding
epistemic, affective, intentional states, first- and second-order
inferences,  etc.).  Here,  adequate  content  validity  might  have
made  some  questions  more  difficult  than  others,  decreasing
this  statistic  [115,116],  which  in  our  opinion  is  a  worthwhile
tradeoff. Furthermore, the alpha values observed for the mental
state reasoning score are similar or superior to those derived
from other ToM ability tests (e.g., [122,123]).
The correlation between the fantasy scale and SST mental
state  reasoning  performance  is  consistent  with  other  studies
showing  significant  positive  inter-relationships  among  the
fantasy scale, Eyes Task performance, and exposure to fiction.
More specifically, healthy adults who report greater exposure to
fiction report higher scores on the fantasy scale (but not other
subscales  of  the  IRI)  and  perform  better  on  the  Eyes  Task,
even  after  controlling  for  demographic  and  personality
variables  [92,93].  Additional  research  has  demonstrated  that
greater  transportation  into  the  emotional  life  of  fictional
characters  is  associated  with  increased  empathy  over  time
[96].  The  current  data  provide  additional  evidence  that
individuals who become immersed in the mental life of fictional
characters  perform  better  on  ToM  tasks.  This  raises  the
intriguing possibility that fiction reading actually improves ToM
ability.  Though  our  data  cannot  speak  to  causation,  findings
from  preschoolers  demonstrate  that  increased  exposure  to
storybooks  predicts  better  ToM  ability  [94].  Given  that
preschool children are unable to control their access to the type
of  media  they  are  exposed  to,  self-selection  effects  (i.e.,
individuals who are better at ToM simply enjoy reading fiction
more)  are  unlikely.  Furthermore,  its  been  shown  that  adults
randomly  assigned  to  read  a  short  piece  of  literary  fiction
outperform individuals assigned to read non-fiction on a variety
of ToM tasks, including the Eyes Task [124]. The way in which
fiction reading could improve ToM may occur through several
routes. One possibility is that fiction provides an opportunity to
simulate the character’s social experience and thus provide a
forum for the reader to practice reasoning about others’ mental
states, and using that information to imaginatively implement
appropriate social behaviors. Another possibility is that fiction
helps readers build their social knowledge by exposing them to
social rules and contingencies presented in the context of the
story [91,92]. If reading fiction does indeed improve ToM ability,
it would have obvious clinical applications, as it could be an
easily  implemented  and  cost-effective  intervention  for
individuals  with  ToM  impairment.  Additional  research  has
demonstrated  that  brief  exposure  to  short  fictional  stories
decreases  one’s  need  for  cognitive  closure,  specifically  the
need  for  order  and  structure  and  discomfort  with  ambiguity
[125].  Such  decreased  rigidity  regarding  intolerance  of
uncertainty  may  be  a  similar  skill  to  that  trained  by  many
interventions  that  aim  to  improve  impaired  social  cognitive
abilities, such as Cognitive Enhancement Therapy [126], Social
Cognition  and  Interaction  Training  [8],  and  Social  Cognitive
Skills Training [127]. These interventions aim, in part, to reduce
“jumping to conclusions” (i.e., forming rigid interpretations not
amenable  to  disconfirming  evidence)  regarding  what  other
individuals may be thinking, feeling, or intending, and foster an
individual’s ability to flexibly evaluate multiple interpretations of
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improving ToM ability per se, fiction reading may additionally
cultivate  more  general  skills  that  subserve  social  cognitive
ability.
Mental state reasoning scores and spontaneously inferring a
character’s mental state were unrelated to understanding the
non-mental aspects of the story, suggesting that our questions
isolated ToM ability and not general reading ability. With that
said,  despite  our  efforts  to  reduce  the  non-social  cognitive
demands of the task (i.e., verbal ability, memory) by using a
story with relatively easy-to-read prose, allowing participants to
refer back to the story as needed, and providing them with the
questions,  mental  state  reasoning  scores  exhibited  a
significant,  although  weak,  positive  association  with  IQ.  We
found a similar positive relationship between IQ and our other
social-cognitive  ability  measure,  the  Eyes  Task.  Positive
associations between IQ or verbal ability and ToM have been
found  in  studies  with  children  [128,129],  individuals  with
schizophrenia  [1,34],  and  individuals  with  autism  spectrum
disorders  [130-134].  This  relationship  becomes  especially
apparent when ToM is tested with verbal stimuli. Similar to our
study, given the verbal demands of the SST, it is not surprising
that there exists some relationship between IQ and ToM ability
as  measured  here.  Importantly,  despite  this  relationship,  we
found SST task performance to be related to the Eyes Task
and the fantasy scale even after controlling for IQ. Additionally,
the fact that comprehension scores were not related to either
the IRI or Eyes Task provides further support that the mental
state  reasoning  score  is  indexing  ToM  ability  and  not  some
peripheral cognitive process or ability that is concomitant with
mental state reasoning.
Several  limitations  are  notable.  First,  our  measure  of
spontaneous  mental  state  inference,  while  associated  with
performance on the mental state reasoning questions, was not
associated with performance on either the IRI or Eyes Task. It
is  noteworthy  that  individuals  who  did  make  a  spontaneous
mental  state  inference  had  higher  scores  on  several  IRI
subscales and the Eyes Task of reasonable effect sizes (e.g.,
perspective-taking d = .37); however, statistical significance (p
< .05) was not achieved. We probed spontaneous mental state
inference with a single question and coded responses into a
dichotomous  variable,  all  of  which  may  have  limited  the
sensitivity  of  the  measure  and  our  ability  to  pick  up  on
individual differences. Spontaneous mental state inference may
be better evaluated with tasks that capture a wider range of
performance. Eye-tracking patterns during visual inspection of
social images, for example, may be a better proxy of real-world
social  interaction  in  which  mental  state  information  is  often
initially processed through gaze following [89]. It will also be
important  to  tease  apart  the  spontaneous  mention  of  mental
states relative to the spontaneous mention of non-mental state
content  (e.g.,  [135]);  something  which  we  were  unable  to
investigate here due to the limited mention of mental states and
short  overall  responses.  Furthermore,  as  part  of  the
instructions,  which  were  administered  prior  to  this  question,
participants  were  asked  to  consider  the  story  characters’
thoughts,  feelings,  and  intentions  when  it  applied  to  the
question. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the mention
of  mental  states  here  can  be  considered  truly  spontaneous.
With that said, only half of participants made a mental state
inference to this question suggesting that the mention of mental
states  here  was  not  considered  mandatory  (as  could  have
been interpreted from the instructions), and reflects differences
in the salience or importance of mental states to the participant
as central to the story’s events. Second, we do not have data
speaking  to  the  predictive  validity  of  the  SST,  specifically
concerning real-world social outcomes. Given the relationship
between  ToM  and  social  functioning,  we  would  expect  SST
ToM  scores  to  predict  social  skills  and  social  success  both
longitudinally  and  cross-sectionally.  Experience  sampling
methods  that  allow  for  repeated,  momentary  assessment  of
real-world  social  interaction  would  be  well  suited  to  address
this  important  question.  Lastly,  we  tested  the  SST  with  a
relatively  small  number  of  participants.  As  a  consequence,
many of the analyses may have been underpowered (e.g., the
correlations between SST scores and IRI scores where n = 44
or less) and should be interpreted with caution.
In summary, the SST represents a new task for assessing
ToM ability in adults that is sensitive to individual differences,
correlates with other well established measures of ToM ability,
and is relatively quick and easy to administer and score. Given
the diversity of contexts in which mental state attributions are
made  [25],  we  recommend  the  use  of  this  task  with  other
measures of social cognition that test ToM in these different
contexts.  There  is  still  much  progress  to  be  made  in  the
assessment of ToM and we hope that the use of this task will
be fruitful in that endeavor.
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